Introduction
This paper is an interpretive response to Annex 2 of Eudralex-Volume 4; the European Union (EU) guidelines for good manufacturing practice (GMP) of medicinal products for human and veterinary use (1) . It was written collaboratively, by a team of experts in closed system processing, from 26 companies in the biopharmaceutical industry facilitated by BioPhorum Operations Group (BPOG), who have a history of assessing the potential for new technologies to benefit the industry (2, 3) . The authors listed on the title page were lead contributors to the content of this document, writing sections, editing, and liaising with colleagues to ensure that the messages it contains are representative of current thinking across the biopharmaceutical industry. This paper is a consensus view of a response to Annex 2, but it does not represent fully the internal policies, views, or opinions of the authors' respective companies.
The purpose of this paper is to share an interpretation of key areas of Annex 2, providing enhanced clarity for the industry. This paper supports a scientific and risk-based approach that identifies the biological active substance manufacturing requirements, and the types of control that meet those requirements. Annex 1, pertaining to sterile manufacturing operations and sterile products, will be revised through 2015 and into 2016 (4).
Annex 2 focuses on the manufacture of biological active substances and biological medicinal products for human use.
Annex 2 states the importance of quality risk management (QRM) principles in the development of control strategy [such as those principles described in ICH Q9 (5) ]. However, Annex 2 references Annex 1 in a number of places, leading to potential misinterpretation, that is, that the environmental classification cascades and associated controls described in Annex 1 (sterile products) are required for facilities and manufacturing systems in scope for Annex 2 as well. On the other hand, QRM enables selection of controls that are proportionate to the risk identified, as opposed to non-risk-based conventional approaches. The authors of this paper value the QRM approach, and it is their opinion that QRM should drive the design of process and control strategies for the mitigation of contamination and cross-contamination risks.
A goal for QRM, in terms of facility design, is to apply risk-based approaches to the management of contamination and cross-contamination that add the highest value regarding product quality and patient safety. It is not always necessary to employ conventional mitigation methods like environmental controls. For example, if one uses a completely closed system of operation, QRM evaluation may determine that environmental controls are not required for the closed process steps. In this paper, the authors focus on the application of QRM to the following topics:
1. References to Annex 1 in Annex 2, which could be interpreted to imply nonsterile facilities, should apply sterile facility controls.
The authors recognize Annex 1 will be revised (4) and see this as an opportunity to clarify guidance in line with some of the reasons for commenting in this paper.
2. Potential alternatives to specific text in Annex 2, pertaining to "Premises and Equipment", "Starting and Raw Material" and "Operating Principles". These are considered to be open to a range of interpretations and are frequently the subject of lengthy debate when biopharmaceutical facilities are designed and built.
References To Annex 1 In Annex 2
Annex 2 applies to the manufacture of biological active substances and medicinal products for human use. The two instances in which Annex 2 refers to Annex 1, which applies to the manufacture of sterile medicinal products, sometimes lead the reader to the interpretation that Annex 1 also applies verbatim to the manufacture of biological active substances. That interpretation is contrary to the QRM principles espoused in Annex 2.
Annex 1 is referenced only to provide principles and guidance for establishing classified environments to mitigate contamination risks as deemed necessary. Annex 2 is clear that the environmental controls should be conceived and established through the execution of a QRM process. The following sections show the instances where Annex 2 references Annex 1 and how these references instead could be applied to biopharmaceutical processes using the QRM framework.
Annex 2, Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6, in the "Premises and Equipment" section, states:
"6. Manufacturing and storage facilities, processes and environmental classifications should be designed to prevent the extraneous contamination of products. Prevention of contamination is more appropriate than detection and removal, although contamination is likely to become evident during processes such as fermentation and cell culture. Where processes are not closed and there is therefore exposure of the product to the immediate room environment (e.g., during additions of supplements, media, buffers, gasses, manipulations during the manufacture of ATMPs) control measures should be put in place, including engineering and environmental controls on the basis of QRM principles. These QRM principles should take into account the principles and guidance from the appropriate sections of Annex 1 18 to EudraLex, Volume 4, when selecting environmental classification cascades and associated controls."
Footnote 18 provides clarification regarding the application of Annex 1 for active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) manufacturing:
18 Although the title of Annex 1 refers to the manufacture of sterile medicinal products it is not the intention to force the manufacture of sterile product at a stage when a low bioburden is appropriate and authorized. Its use is because it is the only EU GMP source of guidance on all of the classified manufacturing areas including the lower grades D and C."
Reason for Commenting
The application of QRM principles to the manufacture of biological products often indicates the use of designs that differ from the environmental control measures dictated by Annex 1. The statement that control measures should be based on QRM principles, followed by the statement that these should take into account guidance from relevant sections in Annex 1, could lead to an interpretation that Annex 1 should be applied directly to the manufacture of biological active substances. The statement in footnote 18, that it is not the intention of Annex 1 to force sterile manufacturing when ". . . a low bioburden is appropriate and authorized", provides some clarification but is open to number of different interpretations.
Interpretation
It is proposed that decisions to assign area classification and implement other controls to prevent contamination should consider the nature of the operation, stage of the manufacturing process, and QRM outcome.
Clearly, the ingress of contaminants into process fluids or materials should be minimized to prevent adverse impact on the product. The risk-based approach requires development of justified control measures to potential sources of environmental contamination. This requires justification beyond simply assuming that filtration or other downstream purification steps remove environmental contaminants that enter during processing, or that contamination will be detected.
The following case illustrates the tenet that control measures should be commensurate with the risks (5) and the consequences of simple adherence to Annex 1 for biopharmaceutical processes:
One case where the risk profile of biological active substances manufacturing differs from sterile product manufacturing is an open aseptic process for inoculum preparation for cell culture. The operations often involve open manipulations of cell culture using aseptic processing techniques. Across the industry, Grade A conditions are achieved in the unidirectional air flow hood often used for such operations. The objective is to avoid microbial or viral contamination of the culture during these operations.
In the above example, adherence to all Annex 1 requirements for Grade A environments is not necessarily required to avoid contamination of the culture. However, since Annex 2 refers the reader to Annex 1 for principles and requirements of classified areas, one might conclude that an open operation, like inoculum preparation, where microbial contamination will result in failure of the batch, requires adherence to all Annex 1 background and in-process monitoring requirements for a Grade A environment.
Specifically, paragraph 33 from Annex 1 in the section "Aseptic Preparation" states: "33. Handling and filling of aseptically prepared products should be done in a grade A environment with a grade B background."
Hence, adherence to Annex 1 aseptic requirements would require a Grade B background environment for the Grade A environment for aseptic operations in biological active substances manufacturing. However, this interpretation may result in conditions that impede reliable manufacture of cell culture products. Application of Annex 1 requirements should be challenged and the design justified using QRM, to ensure the patient is being protected in the most appropriate way.
In the case of open operations that fill sterile medicinal products, Annex 1 applies and requires a Grade A environment with a Grade B background. This makes sense, as there are no additional steps to remove or inactivate microbial contaminants and limited opportunity to detect contamination before the product is given to the patient. In such a context, the Annex 1 requirement provides appropriate controls.
However, the Annex 1 requirements are less appropriate for inoculum preparation. Additional layers of protection are provided in the process and controls and mitigate the impacts of potential contamination:
• A microbial load or viral contamination would likely be detected through cell culture testing. Annex 2 acknowledges this point in paragraph 6 where it states ". . . contamination is likely to become evident during processes such as fermentation and cell culture."
• Inoculum preparation is at the very beginning of many API manufacturing processes, with additional detection points and downstream process steps that remove contaminants.
Therefore, the risk profile of inoculum preparation differs from that of filling of sterile medicinal products. QRM evaluation will often indicate different requirements for this process step.
In current practice, industry has significant experience performing cell culture expansions in a Grade A hood with Grade C or Grade D background environments with very good success and exceedingly low contamination rates.
Regulatory authorities have supported this practice. For example, the Irish Medicines Board, Reference 6 states: "Typically, Grade C background with Grade A supply BSC is considered acceptable". An Aide Mé-moire (071210BN) issued by the German Health Authority (ZLG) indicates that a Grade A unidirectional flow hood in a Grade C background environment is appropriate for establishing a cell bank (7).
Annex 2, Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33 of Annex 2 in the "Starting and Raw Materials" section also refers to Annex 1:
33. Given that the risks from the introduction of contamination and the consequences to the finished prod-uct is the same irrespective of the stage of manufacture, establishment of a control strategy to protect the product and the preparation of solutions, buffers and other additions should be based on the principles and guidance contained in the appropriate sections of Annex 1. The controls required for the quality of starting and raw materials and on the aseptic manufacturing process, particularly for cell-based products, where final sterilization is generally not possible and the ability to remove microbial by-products is limited, assume greater importance. Where an MA [Marketing Authorization] or CTA [Clinical Trial Authorization] provides for an allowable type and level of bioburden, for example at active substance stage, the control strategy should address the means by which this is maintained within the specified limits."
Reason for Commenting
The statement that the consequences of contamination are ". . . the same irrespective of the stage of manufacture", and that a control strategy should be based on ". . . appropriate sections of Annex 1", though "appropriate sections" are not specified, indicates that very strong contamination controls should be in place throughout every process. However, a QRM approach would indicate that the risk of contamination is lower upstream in the process than downstream, as downstream filtration and purification steps remove and provide opportunities to detect contamination. Stronger controls may be required further downstream in the process, where there are fewer subsequent purification steps and opportunities for detection.
While the initial statement of the paragraph is not in accordance with QRM, the statement at the end of the paragraph that "the Marketing Authorization (MA) or the Clinical Trial Authorization (CTA) may provide for an allowable bioburden level and that controls need to be in place to ensure those specified bioburden levels" are consistent with the risk-based approach that is prescribed throughout Annex 2. Apparently contradictory statements in paragraph 33 may lead to confusion and misinterpretation for an end user.
Interpretation
As stated in the previous section, paragraph 6 states that prevention of contamination is more appropriate than detection and removal. The authors agree with this approach so long as it is interpreted within a QRM framework. Some operations, such as solution preparation, are typically open operations, and microbial contamination is successfully removed by filtration. However, applying Grade C conditions to solution preparation in biological active substance manufacturing operations (as specified under paragraph 17 of Annex 1) may not be an appropriate control for a risk-based approach where many factors are considered.
In the following example for solution preparation, it is obvious that raw material is the primary contamination source as opposed to influences from the environment. Hence, controls developed to address bioburden from raw materials will also address bioburden from the environment.
Consider a solution preparation operation in which 1000 L of solution is prepared with a total solids concentration in the solution of 50 g/L. The solids used in the solution are manufactured under controlled, nonclassified conditions (at best). None of the solids are tested for viruses, but all are tested for bioburden and have a maximum bioburden specification of 100 CFU/g. This means that the final solution could contain 5,000,000 CFU of bioburden from the raw materials alone. This does not include microbial propagation in the solution during preparation.
The solids are added through an open port on the solution preparation vessel in an open manner. Environmental conditions should be set so that the potential additional contamination is negligible in comparison to the inherent microbial load in the starting materials. Even if the air contained 1000 CFU/m 3 , five times higher than the recommended values for Grade D specification in operation, 50 m 3 of air (50,000 L) would have to enter the tank during the addition process in order to introduce 50,000 CFUs of bioburden, which is 1% of the maximum allowable amount of bioburden based on the raw material specifications. For a briefly exposed operation, exchange of 50 m 3 of air between the vessel and surroundings is not credible, because both must be at the same pressure for the open operation. No driving force exists for rapid air exchange between the tank and the room environment. In this context, QRM should drive the appropriate manufacturing controls.
However, the tables in paragraph 17 and paragraph 32 of Annex 1 both mandate a Grade C environment for the preparation of solutions that are subsequently filtered when those solutions are used in a process in which the product is not terminally sterilized. This could lead to the interpretation that solution preparation for biological active substances, when the product is not terminally sterilized, should also be conducted in a Grade C environment. This should not be the case. Due to the inherently greater capability to detect and remove contaminants, the risk profile of biological active substance manufacturing is very different from manufacturing sterile medicinal products. Therefore, a risk-based approach should be taken when setting environmental conditions for such operations. See Appendix A for an example of the application of risk analysis to solution preparation operations. As a model, this example is intended to help when determining appropriate area classifications for such operations.
In summary, the two instances in which Annex 2 refers to Annex 1 may lead the reader to believe that Annex 1 also applies to the manufacture of biological active substance. Annex 1 is only referenced because it provides considerations and guidance for establishing classified environments that may be used to mitigate contamination risks if deemed necessary. In scenarios where Annex 2 is applicable, appropriate environmental controls should be implemented when the requirement is determined through the execution of a QRM process.
Potential Alternatives To Specific Text In Annex 2
The second part of this paper describes interpretations of statements in Annex 2 that the authors consider overly prescriptive and/or that may be interpreted in ways that are inconsistent with a risk-based approach.
Paragraph 5
"As part of the control strategy, the degree of environmental control of particulate and microbial contamination of the production premises should be adapted to the active substance, intermediate or finished product and the production step, bearing in mind the potential level of contamination of the starting materials and the risks to the product. The environmental monitoring program should be supplemented by the inclusion of methods to detect the presence of specific microorganisms (i.e., host organism, yeast, molds, anaerobes, etc.) where indicated by the QRM process."
Reason for Commenting
Paragraph 5 highlights the need for an environmental monitoring program and supplemental requirements as indicated by the QRM process. This might be interpreted to mandate a strong and conservative environmental monitoring program of a type that might be required only in some instances for open processing.
Also, at the end of the paragraph, very specific recommendations for an environmental monitoring program are given. However, the QRM process for a closed system likely would show minimal risk of particulate or microbial contamination when located in a controlled nonclassified (CNC) space where requirements for environmental monitoring are minimal or nonexistent. Usage of the abbreviation "i.e." also indicates an expectation that tests for the listed organisms will be included. Therefore, the team believes that the recommendations in this paragraph relating to an environmental monitoring program are overly prescriptive.
Interpretation
The degree of environmental control for contamination should be risk based and not driven by conventional practices or preset expectation. Elements to be considered when determining the risk of contamination from the environment are:
• Properties of the process materials, for example, growth promoting characteristics could affect hold time.
• The degree of closure of equipment.
For closed and functionally closed systems, the QRM process may determine that the risk of particulate or microbial contamination is minimal and that a CNC environment is appropriate, in which case the environmental monitoring program can be minimized or eliminated as required and appropriate for CNC environments. In the example below, the risk from room environment during cell expansion steps is rendered negligible by an approach to closing the operations.
A typical cell culture seed train process progresses through multiple cell expansion steps and increases batch volume in a process that requires multiple sterile transfers. In each transfer, connections are required that increase the process contamination risk by poten-tially exposing process contact surfaces to the outside environment. To minimize this risk it is critical to keep process vessel connections closed until ready to use and then to join them together while minimizing exposure to the outside environment.
The availability and successful use of sterile closed systems like presterilized disposable media bags and bioreactor bags that can be fitted with transfer, addition, and sample lines significantly reduce or eliminate the process contamination risks that otherwise can be a concern. The closed systems can be integrated through the use of techniques such as tube welding and/or disposable aseptic connectors, therefore ensuring that the process remains closed even when these connections are made. Because the entire seed train can now be performed as a closed system, it is not exposed to the room environment and the operation has been successfully performed without contamination in CNC areas.
The nature of the process step being executed can, of course, have an impact on how best to protect the drug substance, upstream versus downstream of viral clearance. The following example illustrates this for manufacture of a drug substance intermediate:
•
Operations like fermentation are a classic example of an upstream drug substance manufacturing process. Fermentation processes are conducted in a closed system to prevent contamination (i.e., maintain pure culture) and QRM evaluation would support conducting such operations in CNC space.
• Downstream processes like purification of a drug substance have typically been located in classified areas. The higher room classification would often have been selected following a QRM evaluation, because purification operations typically have fewer layers of protection and often include open operations.
Implementation of QRM presents the opportunity to perform downstream operations in CNC or lower classification areas. Modern downstream processes often achieve a high degree of closure, such as utilizing functionally closed systems and single-use technologies (e.g., tube welding and sterile connections). With effectively closed systems coupled with other layers of protection, QRM evaluation may support locating the process in a CNC space, with minimal or no environmental monitoring requirements as determined by QRM evaluation.
For most systems, an effective way to minimize the risk of contamination is not to control the environment but to close the system so that the risk associated with the environment is minimized or eliminated.
Recommendation
Currently paragraph 5 describes environmental monitoring requirements that might be applicable for open systems. It will be beneficial if Annex 2 is revised to indicate that QRM evaluation should determine if EM is required and to what extent for a process step.
Paragraph 50
"A control strategy for the entry of articles and materials into production areas should be based on QRM principles. For aseptic processes, heat stable articles and materials entering a clean area or clean/contained area should preferably do so through a doubled-ended autoclave or oven. Heat labile articles and materials should enter through an air lock with interlocked doors where they are subject to effective surface sanitization procedures. Sterilization of articles and materials elsewhere is acceptable provided that they are multiple wrappings, as appropriate to the number of stages of entry to the clean area, and enter through an airlock with the appropriate surface sanitization precautions."
Reason for Commenting
While paragraph 50 supports the implementation of a QRM approach and the authors fully agree with the first sentence, the remainder of the text describes in some detail the expectations for aseptic processing areas. While this direction may be appropriate for areas where open aseptic processing is conducted, the detailed attention to aseptic processes might lead a reader to conclude that similar controls are expected for a broader spectrum of processes, that is, typical bulk biopharmaceutical manufacturing processes that are not open aseptic processes. The amount of text devoted to aseptic processes and the failure to distinguish closed processes from open processes may influence the end-user to implement designs that do not align with QRM principles, providing an overburden of controls.
Interpretation
Paragraph 50 focuses on the requirements appropriate for aseptic processing with no mention of the typical bulk biopharmaceutical nonaseptic requirements. The QRM process for entry into nonaseptic areas will indicate lower risk than for aseptic areas and minimal risk for entry into nonaseptic areas with functionally closed systems with no need for multiple wrappings and/or multiple stages of entry to the production area. Most of the discussion in paragraph 50 applies for the high-risk aseptic processes, but there is no discussion of lower risk options. Paragraph 50 could be interpreted as requiring multiple wrapping and/or stages of entry and surface sanitization requirements even for low contamination risk situations, such as for nonaseptic operations in closed systems. It is important to have the understanding that QRM evaluation and outcome should determine and inform the control strategy instead of incorporating process controls based on the nature of the process whether it is aseptic or nonaseptic.
Recommendation
Suggested wording: "A control strategy for the entry of articles and materials into production areas should be determined based on QRM principles as applicable to the stage and nature of the process."
Paragraph 54
"Centrifugation and blending of products can lead to aerosol formation and containment of such activities to minimize cross-contamination is necessary."
Reason for Commenting
Centrifuges are often used in manufacturing, often for upstream cell and cellular debris separations. The formation of aerosols may transfer live microorganisms or other contaminants into the environment.
The requirement for "containment of such activities" in paragraph 54 is interpreted as an unconditional need to isolate centrifuges without a rational assessment of the likelihood that aerosols will contaminate the environment and present a significant risk for cross-contamination. As a result, there is a clear expectation that a centrifuge must be located in a separate room, independent of the type, scale, operation, operating time, etc.
Most of the centrifuges now used in biopharmaceutical operations operate as functionally closed systems that do not release aerosols into the environment. For example, while windage and mechanical action may result in considerable aerosol formation inside a disc stack centrifuge, the design of the casing and connections for ventilation, solid and liquid discharges render the system closed and effectively prevent release of aerosols. While other requirements may dictate the isolation of centrifuges, for example, noise abatement, vibration control, proper maintenance, and other safety requirements, QRM may show that a centrifuge may be located and operated in the same room with other unit operations in the same space without a risk of cross-contamination due to aerosols.
Paragraph 54 also refers to blending of products as a potential source of aerosols that present a risk of cross-contamination. Similarly, a perceived risk of blending operations like buffer and media preparation or additions to product vessels is the spread contaminants. When these operations are open and may release particles or aerosols, then QRM may well dictate use of dedicated areas or rooms for such operations. However, QRM also considers the process and other controls, for example, the nature of the blending operation, material properties (e.g., chemical or raw material type), levels of protection (e.g., closed systems, temporal separation, air flow direction), time and length of the operation, etc., to determine whether separate rooms are required.
In summary, dedicated rooms are often built to contain operations like centrifugation or solution preparation even though other methods to prevent aerosol contamination may be more appropriate and may already be intrinsic to the design.
Isolation of other operations that can lead to potential aerosol formation, like homogenization, is often not considered because these operations are not explicitly mentioned in Annex 2.
Interpretation
It is essential to understand the probability or level of aerosol formation and spread and to evaluate the actual risk and consequences for cross-contamination posed by aerosols. Proportional containment measurements should be adopted according to the risk that has been determined. This may not require segregation or isolation of such operations when more robust solutions (like closed processing) are used. This QRM approach is not limited to centrifuges and blending operations, the two examples mentioned in Annex 2. It should include any unit operation that can lead to aerosol formation.
Paragraph 57
"57. In cases where a virus inactivation or removal process is performed during manufacture, measures should be taken to avoid the risk of recontamination of treated products by non-treated products."
Reason for Commenting
Although methods to prevent recontamination are not prescribed in Annex 2, a frequent subject of discussion within industry and regulatory agencies is where and how to segregate pre-and post-viral product process streams to comply with paragraph 57. These discussions and expectations result in inconsistant levels of implementation and strategies.
If a firm decides not to segregate, it is likely that at some point the firm will engage in difficult discussions with regulatory agencies. This is perceived as a business risk rather than a product quality issue. As a result, separate rooms are frequently used for pre-and post-virus removal processing even if a QRM approach indicates that alternative techniques are appropriate.
Interpretation
Achieving viral safety of biological active substances requires more attention than simply undertaking preand post-virus reduction steps into separate rooms. Based on a sound QRM process and appropriate justification, use of physical barriers between pre-and post-virus operations (e.g., separate rooms or closed processing) is just one component of a complete risk mitigation strategy for virus contamination control. Other components include: barriers to virus entry (e.g., characterization of cell banks), raw materials sourcing, robust virus clearance steps, and testing during production to detect any contaminating virus (8) .
Robust control strategies will only be achieved through a sound QRM process and not by solely following the current common practice. Where a virus inactivation or removal process is performed during manufacturing, the QRM approach should provide measures to identify and mitigate the risk of recontamination of treated products by nontreated products, components, or equipment.
Conclusions
While Annex 2 of the EU GMP regulatory guidance clearly embraces QRM, it refers to Annex 1 in ways that could be misinterpreted to imply controls used for sterile product processes should be applied to lowbioburden processes. Recognizing that the ultimate goal of regulatory guidance documents is protection of patients, thus prior to final product being rendered sterile, the bioprocess manufacturing scheme must provide layers of protection or barriers to protect the process from environmental contamination. However, our interpretation of the guidance is that controls for sterile products (i.e., those referred to in Annex 1) are not typically required for biological active substances prior to them being rendered sterile.
Use of a QRM approach ensures the selection of control measures that are commensurate with the potential risks to product and ultimately to the patient. A QRM approach should define the control strategy in line with Annex 2. Protecting the drug substance and intermediates by closing the process is a consistent, reproducible, and robust approach-more so than attempting to control the environment around the manufacturing process. Closing the process yields a lower risk to the manufactured drug substance, and ultimately to the patient.
The authors are aware that there will be a revision of Annex 1 and believe this represents an opportunity to clarify guidance as suggested in this paper (4).
9. ISPE Baseline® Guide. Risk-Based Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products (Risk-MaPP), 1st ed.; 2010; Volume 7.
Appendix: A
As previously stated in the discussion of Annex 2, paragraph 33, Grade C background for solution preparation activities is often accepted as a defacto regulatory requirement.
The following risk assessment example demonstrates that environmental classification controls are only one consideration, and probably not the most significant consideration, when evaluating risks associated with the preparation and storage of buffers used in drug substance purification. In this example, the risk of microbial endotoxins entering the purification process with buffers is evaluated. Application of the scoring criteria indicate that the operation is low risk overall with all the controls in place and that environmental sources of bioburden-related endotoxin are both highly unlikely and highly detectable, rendering them the lowest risk of all.
The example buffer preparation process shown in Figure 1 is conducted in a CNC environment. Table  I shows a number of measures that are in place to avoid introduction and propagation of microorganisms that could produce endotoxins. The preparation vessel remains closed, and when solution components are added, they are added in a protected manner that minimizes exposure of the internal surfaces of the tank to the external environment. After preparation, the buffer is held for a short maximum hold time (12 h) then filtered into a sterile storage bag to reduce bioburden that may be present in raw materials. The buffer is stored under conditions in which there is no, or very low, bioburden and therefore limited opportunity for endotoxins to form during the storage period. Table I provides a risk assessment for the base case scenario shown in Figure 1 . Severity, probability of occurrence, and detection point are all evaluated with respect to the failure mode (microbial endotoxins enter process equipment from storage bag). Table I also provides a risk assessment for a select set of alternatives to the base case (in red and blue text). Values for these alternative cases are also assigned with respect to the failure mode. The analysis of the alternatives shows that increasing the classification of the background environment does not reduce the risk associated with the microbial load or endotoxins in the solution; nonenvironmental factors have a greater impact. The potential contribution of microbial load to the solution from the environment is already negligible in the base case, with controls, in comparison to other potential sources of microbial load. However, other factors can influence the risk. For example, doubling the allowable preparation and filtration time provides more opportunity for microbial contaminants to grow. Reduced preparation temperature lowers the rate at which microbes will proliferate (with only a small risk-reduction impact). Finally, if the addition of solids to the tank is not as protected as described in the base case, there is more opportunity for microbial load to enter from the background environment or personnel. 
Comment/ Explanation
Microbial endotoxins enter purification equipment from buffer.
Endotoxins may enter the drug substance process stream and may not be removed.
High endotoxin concentrations in
the drug product will result in adverse patient reactions.
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[A] Bioburden (that can form endotoxins *) is present in salts.
[B] Bioburden present in CWFI.
[C] Bioburden enters from the environment (CNC background)
[D] Bioburden transferred to interior of tank by operators.
[E] Bioburden present on exterior surfaces of raw material packaging and is transferred to interior of preparation vessel.
[F] Preparation vessel and/or transfer line is inadequately cleaned and sanitized before use. There is bioburden present in the vessel or transfer line prior to the start of the batch.
[G] Solution sits in vessel a long time at room temperature before filtration into storage bag and bioburden grows within the tank.
[H] Initial level of bioburden within the solution is too high and filter is unable to retain the bioburden.
[I] 0.2 micron filter is not integral. Bioburden can pass through during filtration.
[J] Single-use tubing or storage bag is not integral. Bioburden can enter through integrity breach.
[K] Single-use tubing or storage bag inadequately sanitized by the vendor and contains bioburden.
[L] Bioburden accumulates within the bag during storage. Organisms die and release endotoxins into the formulation buffer.
[A] Bioburden specification limits for salts.
[B] Many design and engineering controls in place to avoid bioburden in CWFI.
[B] Periodic sanitization of CWFI distribution system.
[B] Regular environmental monitoring of CWFI.
[C, D, E] Solids added so that exposure of the interior to the vessel to the environment is minimized.
[ Time stamps are checked in the batch record to ensure batch was prepared and filtered within the allowed time.
[I] Filter vendor quality system.
[I] Post-use integrity test performed on each filter.
[J, L] Single-use vendor quality program.
[J] Operator training for inspecting single-use elements prior to use and to avoid damaging single-use elements during handling.
[J] Integrity breach may become evident during filtration and transfer.
[K] Radiation indicators on gamma sterilized elements that are received.
[L] Solution is 0.2 micron filtered prior to storage. Measures J and K are in place to prevent the buffer from being contaminated during the storage period after filtration.
NOTE: Drug substance is tested for microbial endotoxins. The material is not released for final drug product manufacturing if the specified limit is exceeded. * This is assumed whenever bioburden is mentioned within this example. 
